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Abstract   
  
This article examines how the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) collectively 
securitised a non-traditional security issue. Securitisation theory provides a way for government 
policymakers to devote more attention and resources to issues that might otherwise be 
overlooked. Securitisation theory, however, is not without significant shortcoming. The 
framework only emphasises nation-state as the referent object and unit of analysis. By contrast, 
the characteristics of non-traditional security issue threats require a multilevel relationship, as 
national solutions are often inadequate. This study, therefore, highlights the process of 
securitising infectious diseases at the ASEAN level and identifying the types of health challenges 
that have been collectively securitised. This was done through triangulation of academic 
materials, ASEAN’s official statements and semi-structured elite interviews of the discourse on 
Southeast Asian health policy between 1967 and 2010. This study argues that only diseases with 
the potential of becoming a pandemic and threaten the stability of a region have been 
successfully securitised at the regional level. Additionally, collective securitisation has increase 
multilateral cooperation among the ASEAN member states.  
  





Securitisation theory (ST) can be described as a process in which some particular threats are 
classified as security issues by the securitising actor, assigns a special status to the threat, which 
by doing so, allows the actor the means to legitimise their actions (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 
491). ST offers a clearer view of ‘normal’ politics heading into the realm of ‘unusual’ emergency 
politics. Most importantly, ST addresses the question of how to identify an issue as a security 
threat without losing its analytical value. These theoretical strengths have made ST become one 
of the most popular and influential theories developed within security studies (Vuori, 2010). 
 Despite its advantages, ST is not without conceptual and methodological shortcomings. 
For instance, how the actors in ST commenced securitisation received scant attention from the 
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researchers (Sperling & Webber, 2016). Moreover, despite the existence of various nations in the 
world, the framework of ST has only prioritised the nation-state as the reference object (Buzan, 
Wæver, & Wilde, 1998). Meanwhile, scholars studying ST have empirically focused on 
particular states as the unit of analysis (Karyotis, 2012; Robert Glasser, 2016). In contrast, non-
traditional security issue (NTS) threats are characterised by their transnational nature, occurring 
at short notice, and are transmitted rapidly due to globalisation and the communications 
revolutions (Caballero-Anthony, 2008). Hence, national solutions are often inadequate. Some 
state and non-state players tend to move to regional and multilevel connections in the quest of 
responding to the NTS (Caballero-Anthony, Cook, Chng, & Balen, 2013). Multilateral action has 
been identified as the most effective way to deal with a new source of threats, mainly through the 
authority of regional institutions (Pennisi di Floristella, 2012; Zimmerman, 2014).  
 Since the establishment of ASEAN in 1967, AMS (comprised of 10 states – Brunei, 
Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam), 
have always comprehensively dealt with security issues, recognising that the concept of security 
encompasses a wide range of issues including social, cultural, economic, political, and military. 
In other words, ASEAN’s concept of comprehensive security shows that the institution has 
recognised the rise of NTS issues for so long (Sukma, 2010). However, cooperation between 
AMS in addressing the NTS threats is limited as comprehensive security is still very much state-
centric. The institution has been paralysed and in disarray for years (Jetschke & Rüland, 2009) 
when the management of the NTS issues was left discreetly in the hands of individual member 
states to be resolved (Caballero-Anthony, 2016). The general perception was that each state 
faced a distinct threat. Hence, AMS tended to see NTS issues primarily as domestic problems of 
member states that required a national solution. 
 Nonetheless, the securitisation framework has been said as “the most widely applied 
theoretical framework in Southeast Asia” concerning the NTS issues (Jones, 2011, p. 407). This 
raises an interesting question on whether ASEAN has collectively securitised any NTS issue 
occurred in the region because the framework does not adequately address how its concept of 
securitisation can be applied at the regional level (Haacke & Williams, 2008). This article 
addresses the gap by applying the securitisation idea to analyse the collective securitisation of 
health threats in ASEAN. The threat to health has been chosen among other NTS since the 
intersection between health and security has become more apparent. The region is becoming the 
hotspot for emerging infectious diseases (Coker, Hunter, Rudge, Liverani, & Hanvoravongchai, 
2011) and the health threat most suitable for securitisation is the outbreak of infectious diseases 
(Enemark, 2007). Hence, this study also aims to identify the types of infectious disease that have 
been collectively securitised at the ASEAN level. This article seeks to fill in the gap based on the 
triangulation of academic material, official statements and documents drawn from ASEAN’s 
leaders and speeches, declarations and communiqués and semi-structured elite interviews (from 
policy experts to high-ranking public officials) on Southeast Asian health policy discourse 
between 1967 and 2010.  
The article is comprised of several sections. First, it focuses on the steps set out in the 
roadmap to mutual securitisation. Next, the empirical section starts with an overview of 
Southeast Asia’s policy discourse on health between 1967 and 1990s. It briefly discusses the 
usual response of AMS to health issues since the establishment of the institution before moving 
on to the rhetorical securitising of HIV/AIDS spread that occurred between the 1990s and 2000s.  
It then provides evidence of successful securitisation, demonstrates how the sequence of 
infectious outbreaks (SARS, H5N1, and H1N1) have occurred in the region over the last decade 
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and has contributed to the improvements in regional health policy initiatives, and how they have 
been implemented. The conclusions drawn from the key findings of the article are; i) AMS only 
collectively securitised disease at risk of becoming a pandemic, ii) the securitisation framework 




The Collective Securitisation Approach 
 
The idea of securitization theory draws heavily on the theory of language, specifically from the 
branch known as ‘speech act theory’. Through the theory of language, we can regard ‘security’ 
as a speech act. Wæver (1995, p. 35) indicated that ‘Security is not of interest as a sign that refers 
to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it [security], something is done 
(as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship)’. In other words, labelling something as a 
security issue turns it into such, although this does not necessarily mean that a real threat is 
present (Buzan et al., 1998). 
ST requires specific criteria in the process to change an ordinary issue into a security 
issue. Buzan et al. (1998) referred to it as a two-stage process. In the first stage, securitising 
actors (e.g., political leaders) must state that a reference object (something threatened, such as 
the state or the economy) is existentially threatened. This step is known as the securitising move. 
To ensure the issue is securitised, the audience should accept the move made by the securitising 
actor. Thus, in the second stage, for an issue to be regarded as a security issue, the audience must 
accept the interpretation of events by the actor and recognise that extraordinary measures must 
be implemented. 
 Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde emphasised that securitisation requires all the criteria 
(securitising actors, reference object, existential threat, and emergency measures) to be 
successful. Such requirements also indicate that not all issues undergoing the securitisation 
process should automatically be securitised because securitisation is “essentially inter-subjective 
process” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 30). Although the securitising actor managed to pose such an 
existential threat without the approval of the appropriate audience, the threat could not be 
securitised. Only with the consent of the audience can such a move be followed by putting a 
‘normal’ political issue on the emergency politic agenda. This highlights the importance of inter-
subjectivity in determining the success of such a process. 
In comparison to the normal securitisation process, this article argues that the process 
does not automatically involve emergency characteristics when deciding what counts as an 
effective securitisation process (Floyd, 2015). This has the advantage of allowing the ST to be 
used as a possible explanation of particular outcomes even if they are not ‘extraordinary’ or 
‘emergency’. Nevertheless, indicators were set out to identify the extent of ASEAN-level action, 
namely, policy change or institutional arrangements. These two indicators involve a) the creation 
of standard policies, and b) the replacement of existing structures or systems with policies that 
specifically address the issue or the establishment of new institutions, like a task force, alongside 
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1967-1990 - Health Issues in the Early Days 
 
This section addresses ASEAN’s usual response to health issues since the establishment of the 
institution until the spread of HIV/AIDS in the late 1990s. Even though health issues in ASEAN 
have been implicit since the establishment of the institution in 1967, it was only 20 years later 
that health issues were adequately discussed at the regional level. The ASEAN Health Ministers 
(AHM) Meeting held in 1980 marked the region’s first step towards organising collaboration 
between AMS on health issues. In their joint communiqué, the leaders agreed to discuss new 
initiatives and policies collectively aimed at improving the health status of citizens in the region 
(ASEAN Health Ministers, 1980). Although a regional health institution known as the ASEAN 
Institute for Health Development (AIHD) was established in 1982, ASEAN’s collective stance 
on health issues was vague as the meeting was not followed by any mechanisms (ASEAN Health 
Ministers, 1980). Concerning issues like communicable diseases were only categorised as future 
possible areas of regional collaboration (ASEAN, 1980). The situation continued when AHM 
met again in 1984, the main agenda being the review of the policies and strategies agreed at the 
Second Meeting of AHM (ASEAN Health Ministers, 1984). Attention towards health issues 
remained low between 1984 and 1990, as no AHM meeting was organised during that period, 
even though ASEAN regional meetings in other sectors were held as usual. The inconsistencies 
of ASEAN in organising AHM meetings indicated that health issues were not a priority in the 
regional agenda during the 1980s and early 1990s. Hence, no securitisation elements can be 
identified in this period. 
The 1990s-2000s - The Emergence of HIV/AIDS 
The early 1990s saw a significant policy shift on health issues, when Southeast Asian leaders as 
securitising actors, first raised concerns about the growing threat posed by HIV/AIDS at the 4
th
 
AHM Meeting (ASEAN Health Ministers, 1991). ASEAN leaders had a clear sense of urgency 
and saw the need for practical cooperation, as stated in the ASEAN Summit 1992 report, 
whereby the organisation “shall make a coordinated effort in curbing the spread of AIDS by 
exchanging information on AIDS, particularly in the formulation and implementation of policies 
and programmes against the deadly disease” (ASEAN Summit, 1992). This indicated that a 
securitising move had been taken. Practical cooperative measures were also initiated, indicating 
political commitment among AMS. This included the creation of an ASEAN institutional 
structure known as the ASEAN Task Force on AIDS (ATFOA), which initiated the first ASEAN 
Work Programme on AIDS (AWP I) between 1995 and 2000. AWP I focused on prioritising 
regional cooperation, as well as a range of programmes and activities aimed at improving 
coordination between AMS in the fight against HIV/AIDS (ASEAN, 2001).  
 However, in the years that followed, there was a significant change in ASEAN’s 
language. Instead of addressing HIV/AIDS as a regional security issue, ASEAN referred to it as 
a human security issue – a concept that is primarily concerned with the security of individuals 
and communities, in marked contrast to the conventional ASEAN security discourse that 
emphasizes state and regional security. As a result, regional leaders advocated low levels of 
urgency despite acknowledging the increasing number of people living with the disease in the 
region. It became evident in the October 2001 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) report 
that Asia was on the verge of an HIV/AIDS crisis. The study found that one in five sex workers 
GEOGRAFIA OnlineTM Malaysian Journal of Society and Space 16 issue 3 (70-82)  
© 2020, e-ISSN 2682-7727   https://doi.org/10.17576/geo-2020-1603-06 74 
in Vietnam was HIV-positive, and a ten-fold increase in infection rates was observed in 
Indonesian blood donors. The infection rates for Cambodia and Vietnam were above the United 
Nations (UN) epidemic level of 2% while in Burma (Myanmar),  UN officials speculated that the 
infection rates were more than 7% (Jagan, 2001). The BBC report showed the lack of urgency 
among member states, given the fact that initiatives have been enforced for about ten years.  
The HIV/AIDS securitising move was largely rhetorical due to the lack of acceptance by 
the public in terms of member states’ commitment to implementing the regional measures that 
have been initiated. For instance, all AWP I programmes were mostly organised at the state level 
rather than at the regional level (ASEAN Secretariat, 2002). Moreover, each AMS’ views on 
health issues varied as they have different domestic issues. For instance, the impact of economic 
crisis and significant political changes in Indonesia in the 1990s had prevented the government 
from acting swiftly due to the frozen national budget on the health system (Mboi & Smith, 
2006). Meanwhile, in Vietnam, the policy associated with HIV/AIDS is associated with the fight 
against social evil, as this virus was stigmatised with commercialised sex and drug addiction, 
resulting in a slow response from the government (Vietnam News Agency, 2002). The delayed 
impact of HIV/AIDS and domestic constraints mitigate the sense of urgency that often drives 
decision-making and resource allocation among security planners. The lack of convincing 
collective mechanisms and the concept of self-reliance in regional collaboration indicated that 
health issues are generally managed at the national level. As noted by one of the high-ranking 
officers, “ASEAN [cooperation] perhaps is not strong on HIV” (Officer 6, 2016). 
 A significant shift in the health issue of securitising movements was identified between 
2003 and 2010 when Southeast Asia faced SARS, H5N1, and H1N1 outbreaks. Significant 
progress has been made in the region during this time in terms of policy and institutional 
arrangements. Thus, the next segment discusses the health policy debate of Southeast Asia 
between 2003 and 2010 on the process of securitising infectious diseases collectively.  
 




In the early stages of SARS, AMS took a unilateral action to address the outbreak. However, a 
change in the strategy was identified when ASEAN leaders decided to convene regional 
emergency meetings in Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok, despite the short notice. In the Special 
ASEAN+3 Health Ministers Meeting held in Kuala Lumpur in April 2003, AMS and their 
counterparts (China, Japan, and South Korea) jointly articulated a clear sense of urgency about 
the effects that SARS may pose to the region, as the threat of SARS is not only towards the good 
health and livelihood of the public but also to the regional economic growth (ASEAN+3, 2003a). 
Three days later, at the Special ASEAN Summit on SARS and Special ASEAN-China Leaders 
Meeting, the leaders once again reiterated the statement made at the previous meeting. In their 
joint declaration, the ASEAN+3 states declared that SARS poses a serious challenge to the well-
being of the people in the region and the economic development  (ASEAN, 2003a).  
 Both meetings highlight the securitising move and have been significant since there was 
unprecedented regional efforts had been made to halt the spread of the virus. Meetings of the 
ASEAN leaders were convened as quickly as possible during the crisis. Compared to ASEAN’s 
response to other issues, it took less than a month following the SARS eruption to convene two 
regional emergency meetings. The meetings also received tremendous support from AMS when 
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it was attended by the heads of government, except for Malaysia, represented by acting Prime 
Minister Abdullah Badawi. External states leaders from China and Hong Kong also attended the 
meetings. Besides the AHM meetings, it is important to note that the SARS outbreak was also on 
the agenda of other ministerial meetings, such as those of the transport and labour ministers, who 
offered different assessments of the hazards associated with the SARS outbreak (ASEAN+3, 
2003b).  
 Based on the joint declaration and joint statement between ASEAN leaders about the 
threat posed by SARS in both regional meetings, their statements and speeches showed elements 
of securitising logic. Positive speech acts can be identified in both joint statements and 
declarations made at both emergency meetings. Unlike ASEAN’s response towards HIV/AIDS, 
which generated more rhetoric than action, the Bangkok summit final communiqué claimed that 
there was a “collective responsibility to implement stringent measures to control and contain the 
spread of SARS and the importance of transparency in implementing these measures” (ASEAN, 
2003b). AMS moves in the securitisation of the SARS virus were also followed by substantive 
practical measures, starting with the shift of strict pre-departure screening at all exit points. Over 
ten measures were identified in these meetings to curb the spread of SARS, and these measures 
can be divided into two groups: immediate and short-to-midterm measures. Immediate measures 
agreed upon including exchanging information on SARS, the best practices in preventive and 
control measures, contact-tracing for information exchange, and strengthening coordination 
between front-line enforcement agencies such as health, immigration, customs, transport, and 
law enforcement to develop travel protocols to ensure that travellers from affected areas are 
screened for SARS (ASEAN, 2003a). These regional mechanisms were supported by the 
establishment of a regional fund. A particular ASEAN SARS Fund was set up with China 
committed to contributing $1.2 million, while Thailand offered $250,000 and Cambodia 
$100,000 (Macan-Markar, 2003). This special fund was set up to pursue research of SARS in the 
region.  
 The presence of ASEAN top leaders showed the urgency and the acceptance of each 
participant to securitise SARS. The speed with which the regional meetings were called and the 
establishment of agreed practical cooperation was unprecedented in the history of ASEAN 
(Curley & Thomas, 2004). This situation is unique despite each AMS experienced different 
levels of SARS threat; some states like Singapore were severely affected while states like 
Cambodia and Laos were reporting fewer cases. The decisions reached the regional meetings 
would not otherwise have been agreed upon in regular times. This change indicated that ASEAN 
can respond promptly and that the organisation was able to securitise SARS.  
H5N1  
 
A strong sense of denial of the actual threat posed by H5N1 among AMS government at the 
early stage of the outbreak was evident. Despite the first confirmed case of H5N1, which 
occurred within months of the last reported case of SARS at the end of December, a few 
Southeast Asian countries deliberately withheld vital information on their poultry industries to 
protect their economies. The Indonesian government, for instance, insisted that no bird flu had 
been detected in Indonesia although it had been warned that an outbreak of H5N1 had occurred 
in the state since November 2003. Instead, the Indonesian government blamed the Newcastle 
disease virus, a contagious and fatal avian virus, for the deaths of thousands of chickens (Taylor, 
2004). Similarly, in Thailand, the Thai government declared that the massive amount of chicken 
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deaths found in the state in 2003 was due to cholera and bronchitis (Agence France Presse, 
2004). However, it soon became evident that the Thai government was aware that the real cause 
was H5N1 for some time (Cohn, 2004).  Meanwhile, Vietnam, which was already aware of the 
H5N1 outbreak in July 2003, decided to adopt a policy of quiet mitigation because the state was 
busy preparing for a major sporting event (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2004). These three 
examples were likely to conform to ASEAN’s usual practice of unilateral action when faced with 
a regional threat.  
 However, the problem of H5N1 among Southeast Asian states has been brought to the 
brink of regional securitising movement. In late January 2004, Thai’s Prime Minister, Thaksin 
Shinawatra immediately called for a first regional summit, with an affirmative speech act 
regarding H5N1. In the joint statement, AMS leaders stated that H5N1 is “not only severely 
affecting the poultry industry but also has a potential threat to human health” (ASEAN+3, 2004). 
This meeting can be considered successful despite it being convened within just three working 
days (Yuan, 2004). High audience acceptance can be observed when all high-ranking officers 
from ASEAN were present with other states like Japan, China, South Korea, and the US also 
joining the summit, in addition to officers from international organisations like the WHO, FAO, 
OIE, and EU. Since this unprecedented meeting, cooperation among the affected countries in 
Southeast Asia had improved with governments realising the paramount importance of 
transparency in combating the virus (Enemark, 2007).  
 The securitising move continued in the following year. At the 10
th
 ASEAN Summit in 
Laos in November 2004, the Chairman’s Statement articulated a clear sense of urgency in 
recognising bird flu as one of the ‘main challenges’ threatening the region (ASEAN, 2004). 
Following the declaration, a regional task force known as the ASEAN Highly Pathogenic Avian 
Influenza (HPAI) Task Force was set up in December 2004, signalling a transition to the regional 
health arrangement. The HPAI Task Force then developed a detailed action plan, which covered 
eight strategic areas for three years from 2006 to 2008. In the spirit of the task-sharing 
arrangement, the responsibilities in these eight strategic areas were divided among the group’s 
original members, i.e., Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, with each 
country taking on a specific role (The Straits Times, 2004).  
 Cooperation commitments were substantiated the following year. As the viral infection 
peaked in 2005, the threat was the dominant issue in most ASEAN’s regional meetings. At the 
Southeast Asian farm ministers’ meeting, the group’s deputy secretary stressed that the highly 
pathogenic avian influenza could become a “region-wide pandemic if left uncontrolled” (Agence 
France Presse, 2005). The threat continued to prevail in other regional meetings. At the 11
th
 
ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur on December 2005, ASEAN leaders welcomed various 
regional mechanisms. This led to the implementation of practical cooperative measures in 
addressing the virus. These include the establishment of ASEAN Animal Health Trust Fund 
(AAHTF), ASEAN+3 Emerging Infectious Diseases Programme (EID), and a regional network 
of antiviral drugs stockpiles (ASEAN Summit, 2005). These regional mechanisms demonstrated 
that such regional statements were not mere rhetoric but were backed by substantial resource 
allocations. For instance, ASEAN+3 EID programme has become a reference point for regional 
coordination by successfully organising training programmes, seminars, workshops, promoting 
collaboration between the human and animal health sectors, encouraging the exchange of staff 
between reference laboratories, and conducting cross-country comparative research on the social 
and cultural dimensions of infectious diseases (Liverani, Hanvoravongchai, & Coker, 2012). On 
the other hand, the establishment of the ASEAN Animal Health Trust Fund suggested that 
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member states were prepared to commit extra resources (extra-budgetary reallocation) in 
furtherance of the regional avian influenza programme. This marked the urgency of the 
organisation in combating avian influenza at the regional level. Given that only some states in 
the region were afflicted with the disease, it demonstrated the urgency of ASEAN countries to 
work together in addressing the issue.  
 H5N1 remained high on the agenda of ASEAN regional meetings. Following the 11
th
 
ASEAN Summit, the first East Asia Summit (EAS) was convened. Apart from the Kuala 
Lumpur Declaration, which was a declaration on the establishment of EAS, the only declaration 
adopted during the summit was the Declaration of Avian Influenza Prevention, Control, and 
Response (East Asia Summit, 2005). This was the region’s first declaration of dealing with the 
bird flu epidemic. This separate declaration reflects the sense of great urgency and imminent 
danger that prevailed during the outbreak, as well as the need to collaborate in tackling the 
dreaded avian flu. By doing so, it acknowledged and raised awareness of the pandemic potential 
caused by the H5N1 virus.  
 H5N1 remained one of ASEAN’s main security threat for a few years. According to 
President Arroyo’s statement as Chairperson at the 12
th
 ASEAN Summit, the avian flu was still 
ranked as a major regional security threat and remained securitised (Arroyo, 2007). The urgency 
to cope with the virus continued with collaborations between ASEAN and its counterparts; 
namely China, Japan, and South Korea, as well as international organisations. Starting from 2006 
onwards, the ASEAN+3 Health Ministers Meeting was launched. Various regional mechanisms 
between ASEAN and its counterparts can be traced since then. A Regional Monitoring Centre on 
Infectious Diseases has been set up with Japan making a new pledge of US$67 million to fight 
avian flu and other pandemic diseases (Maier-Knapp, 2011). Meanwhile, a simulation exercise 
called PanStop was conducted in Cambodia to test the readiness of countries in the region to 
contain the spread of infection during a pandemic outbreak. This exercise was coordinated by the 
ASEAN Secretariat with the help of the WHO and the Japanese government.  
Despite the lack of government transparency in the early outbreak of H5N1, ASEAN 
successfully securitised the issue. Having acknowledged the H5N1 threat, political leaders 
likewise translated their positive speech acts into practical action, including establishing ASEAN 
HPAI Task Force, increasing disease surveillance, and stockpiling antiviral medicine. The 
abovementioned speech act was also reinforced by other positive outcomes, such as the 
establishment of regional financial support ASEAN Animal Health Trust Fund (AAHTF). All 
AMS agreed to contribute to the fund regardless of H5N1 threat on their country. Taking into 
account the various regional mechanisms that were established and accepted by the AMS, it is 




Previous outbreaks showed ASEAN acting unilaterally during the early stages of an outbreak. 
Unlike previous responses, ASEAN was more responsive in dealing with the H1N1 outbreak. In 
their first response, ASEAN’s Secretary-General, Surin Pitsuwan said that “ASEAN member 
states are better prepared now following the experience of SARS and avian influenza outbreaks”  
(Pitsuwan, 2009). The organisation started stockpiling antiviral drugs courtesy of Japan and 
distributed it among member states for rapid response (Channel NewsAsia, 2009). The ASEAN 
Secretariat has also been fully alerted, 24 hours a day, and seven days a week to anticipate any 
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request by member states for antiviral drugs (Malaysia General News, 2009). Also, pertinent 
information was shared instantly through teleconferences. Notably, this information sharing 
mechanism between AMS has demonstrated, over a short period, the initial actions of regional 
emergency measures in response to the threat (Malaysia General News, 2009). The mechanisms 
used to deal with the outbreak have been significant, as none of the AMS reported any incidents 
since the confirmation made by the WHO in April 2009. Positive speech acts by various actors 
could be identified during the emergency meeting. Surin Pitsuwan referred to the virus as a 
regional concern (Pitsuwan, 2009), while the Thai Prime Minister articulated a clear sense of 
urgency and shared perceptions about the need for practical regional cooperation (Deutsche 
Presse-Agentur, 2009). Collective positive speech acts between ASEAN member states could 
also be identified in their joint declaration during the special meeting (ASEAN+3, 2009).  
 The securitising speech acts by a wide range of actors and the frequency with which they 
had been deployed since the official announcement of the H1N1 outbreak have had a 
demonstrable impact. The speech act used was supported by a wide range of collective regional 
measures adopted by the member states in the meetings. The measures agreed in the joint 
ministerial statement include the continuous implementation of the national pandemic 
preparedness plan, strengthening surveillance and responses, as well as effective communication. 
Surin Pitsuwan described these collective regional measures as “a booster shot in our common 
efforts to address this new form of influenza” (ASEAN, 2009a). These regional mechanisms led 
to the implementation of practical measures to help with protecting state borders, exchanging 
crucial information, and the mobilisation of antiviral drugs. ASEAN also unanimously enforced 
strict screening measures. In addition to organising emergency exercises, hotlines between 
national health authorities have been set up to cut bureaucracy to ensure effective and timely 
deployment of stockpiles of medicines, medical supplies, and other personal protective 
equipment (ASEAN, 2009a). The urgency to treat H1N1 as a regional threat continued to be 
accepted and discussed in other regional meetings. The outbreak caught the eyes of leaders who 
attended the 4
th
 ASEAN Summit, even though most of the summit agenda focused on Southeast 
Asia’s economic issues and the financial crisis (ASEAN, 2009b).  
 Compared to previous outbreaks, AMS was proactively responding to the announcement 
made by the WHO on H1N1, although they were not affected in the beginning. This proved that 
ASEAN, as an organisation, has changed its ways in addressing regional pandemics. The joint 
statements of member states followed by practical measures also demonstrated that collective 





This article set out to analyse whether ASEAN has successfully securitised the health threats 
collectively. In the early years since the establishment of ASEAN until the end of 1980s, 
health issues have been viewed as low-level policy issues and received low attention at the 
regional level, as it was recognised by the institution as a domestic issue. The study revealed 
that AMS only collectively securitised diseases with the risk of becoming pandemic. Despite 
attempts to securitise the disease of HIV/AIDS in the early 1990s, ASEAN failed to fully 
securitise the issue, as it lacked political commitments from the member states. As one of the 
policy experts said in the interview, “We do prepare for a pandemic. Other health issues 
from the communicable diseases like HIV, Tb [tuberculosis], we address it as [a] public 
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issue” (Officer 1 2016). This article demonstrated that collective securitising moves towards 
health issues had been developed since 2003. Series of infectious disease outbreaks; namely 
SARS, H5N1, and H1N1 have led ASEAN leaders to develop health problem policy that 
strengthens cooperation between AMS. Despite each disease outbreak, various regional 
health mechanisms have been adopted, with AMS facing a different level of threats. This 
was a crucial development, as opposed to the argument that securitisation is state-centric. 
Therefore, it could not be implemented on a multilevel basis. More importantly, it also 
revealed that securitisation has to move ASEAN’s cooperation beyond the state-centric 
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